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 When William Clark stepped off a steamboat 
at Jefferson Barracks, just below St. Louis, in 
September 1832, he figured he had finally won. 
Clark, Indian Commissioner for the region, took the 
Sauk chief Keokuk and his entourage to the barracks 
prison to visit the latest arrivals, Black Hawk and a 
half-dozen of his fellow leaders. Clark and Keokuk 
knew they were in the midst of a new era of relations 
between the native peoples and the expanding United 
States. All three leaders—William Clark, Keokuk, 
and Black Hawk—thought they were promoting 
the best interests of Native Americans, too. During 
the 1820s, Clark had come around to the view that 
proximity to whites was hindering the process of 
“civilization”—making the Indians in the white 
man’s image—and that clearly the Indians needed to 
relocate away from the corrupting influences of white 
society where they could grow and evolve—become 
“civilized”—at their own pace. American officials 
like Clark and Lewis Cass held that the federal 
government was obliged to provide everything 
needed to facilitate the process; Clark believed the 
move should come of mutual consent, whereby the 
Indians agreed to move and to an agreeable location. 
 Thanks to William Clark, Keokuk had risen 
to a position of prominence and leadership among 
the Sauks. Clark supported the rising Sauk leader 
with gifts and supplies that he could take back to 
the tribe, solidifying his position there. He was 
among the Native American leaders Clark took 
back to Washington to meet the president. There, 
Keokuk became convinced that American expansion 
was inevitable, that whites were too numerous to 
resist, and that survival depended on figuring out 
how to accommodate them. By decade’s end, the 
Sauk leader was squarely in the American camp 
and held substantial (but not total) control within 
his community. Black Hawk, by contrast, held fast 
to traditional views. He had a strong connection 
to the land in northwestern Illinois, distrusted the 
Americans, and felt that the Sauk should never 
succumb to American lifestyles, alcohol, clothes, or 
dictates. Yet these three men came together in 1832 
at the prison at Jefferson Barracks as symbols of 
fundamental changes under way. When they stood 
at the barracks on that fall day, they represented a 
critical change in the relations between the United 
States and the Native American tribes it had pushed 
farther and farther west, as proof that the United 
States government would stop at nothing to spread its 
wings and people across the continent. How did they 
get here, how did it end up like this, and what did it 
mean for future relations between the United States 
and the tribes?
 The roots of the problem stretched to the “three 
flags ceremony” in St. Louis in March 1804. It really 
wasn’t much, as ceremonies go, although the impact 
of the transfer of Louisiana to the United States 
was profound. Spain symbolically transferred the 
territory to France, which then transferred it to the 
United States the following day. Among the highest-
ranking American military officials on hand were 
Captains Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, co-
commanders of the Corps of Northwest Discovery. 
But Lewis and Clark weren’t the only foreign 
dignitaries in town when the transfer took place. Also 
on hand was a delegation of Sauk and Fox Indians, 
most likely including a warrior named Black Sparrow 
Hawk, in town to settle a dispute over the murder of 
some white settlers by four Sauk hunters the previous 
Left–Black Hawk came to symbolize the fight over land ownership between the tribes and the United States government and 
the problems with former treaties. (Image: Missouri History Museum)
By the time George Catlin painted this portrait, William 
Clark had been overseeing relations between western tribes 
and the United States government for almost a quarter of a 
century. In Washington, officials generally thought of Clark 
and Secretary of War (and former Michigan territorial 
governor) Lewis Cass as perhaps the most knowledgeable 
federal officials on tribal affairs. (Image: National Museum 
of American Art)
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year.1 
 The event historians call “Black Hawk’s War” 
was the culmination of almost three decades of 
strained relations with the Sauk and Fox tribes in 
northwestern Illinois and eastern Iowa; for most 
of that time, William Clark was a central player 
representing the interests of the United States. It was 
a relationship that tested not only Clark’s natural 
patience but everything he had learned as well. Clark 
had signed more treaties with Native Americans than 
perhaps any other white American—some negotiated 
with tribal leaders, others imposed upon them—and 
had generally opposed using force. By the time 
Andrew Jackson took office in March 1829, Clark 
had a long-standing reputation for civil firmness in 
dealing with western Indians, and as the one man 
they were most likely to trust and listen to. Indeed, 
a main reason he lost the gubernatorial election in 
Missouri in 1820 was the perception outside St. Louis 
that he was “soft” on Indians. Yet Black Hawk never 
trusted the Americans, and that included the Red-
Headed Chief in St. Louis, no matter what Keokuk 
and others said. The two men—and their respective 
peoples—had a turbulent relationship for a quarter 
of a century that grew more so after 1822. Black 
Hawk and his so-called “British band” challenged 
the United States at decade’s end, ultimately leading 
Clark to support attacking the troublesome subset 
of Sauks and chasing them down like dogs as they 
sought to retreat west across the Mississippi. Black 
Hawk’s War represents one of the great paradoxes 
of William Clark: How and why could and did he 
come to his position in 1831 and 1832? Ultimately, 
it brings to sharp focus the fact that Clark found 
himself truly straddling two worlds and two sets of 
priorities—his belief in progress and the advance of 
civilization as white settlers moved westward into 
the frontier and the government’s duty to facilitate a 
peaceful transition, while at the same time wrestling 
with his own views about handling the native peoples 
living there. 
 Part of the issue is that Black Hawk—and the 
federal government’s response to his actions of 1831 
and 1832—speaks to the different views of Indians 
held on either side of the Appalachians. Easterners 
(and especially northeastern thinkers), now largely 
distanced from direct and regular experience with 
indigenous peoples, had come to see them as “noble 
savages,” childlike victims who required care and 
patience from the United States government. So 
long as easterners from the New England and the 
mid-Atlantic states like James Monroe, John Quincy 
Adams, and their administrations dominated the 
executive branch, federal policy and actions would 
reflect a desire to continue acquiring Indian lands in 
the West while providing tools and mechanisms to 
“civilize” the Indians in their new western homes. 
But Andrew Jackson represented a completely 
different mindset that was more typical of westerners. 
He saw Native Americans as “morally depraved, 
diabolically cruel killers of innocent white women 
and children, and brutish, subhuman obstacles 
to the advancement of republican civilization.” 
William Clark was one of the few men straddling 
this intellectual chasm. He thought more like an 
easterner, but he lived and had extensive experience 
in the West. This hybridization of lessons learned, 
vast experience, and regional viewpoints led Clark 
to recommend and support a military solution to the 
“Black Hawk problem.”
 The relationship between the Sauk and Fox and 
the United States got off on the wrong foot almost 
immediately. Changes in political status, Americans 
cozying up with the dreaded Osage, a dubious 
land purchase, and a potential threat to the Sauks’ 
lucrative fur trade with Europeans made tribal leaders 
uneasy.
 Now, Indiana governor William Henry Harrison 
imposed a new treaty on the Sauks. At the time of the 
treaty, the allied tribes claimed substantial territory 
on both sides of the Mississippi River spanning 
present-day southwestern Wisconsin, northwestern 
Illinois, and eastern and central Iowa.2 Their main 
settlement was at Saukenuk, just up the Rock River 
from the Mississippi in Illinois, where women grew 
When the United States purchased Louisiana from France, 
a ceremony in St. Louis in March of 1804 symbolized 
the land transfer in upper Louisiana. Often referred to as 
the “three flags ceremony,” the land was transferred from 
Spain to France, then from France to the United States. 
Black Hawk was almost certainly on hand for it, as was 
Capt. Meriwether Lewis, Clark’s co-captain in the Corps of 
Discovery, which was encamped across the river in Illinois.  
(Image: Missouri History Museum)
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corn and other agricultural products and chiefs 
orchestrated hunts, commerce, and foreign relations. 
Exactly what transpired (and why) remains open 
to conjecture, and whether it included Harrison’s 
liberality with promises and liquor or the chiefs’ 
thinking that they were merely normalizing economic 
relations with the new Americans, the resulting treaty 
turned out to become a source of misunderstanding 
and, ultimately, Black Hawk’s War.3 
 To us looking back at 1804 from today, it seems 
like a formula for disaster. The problem all stemmed 
from the land boundaries. The Sauks gave to the 
United States all their land east of the Mississippi. 
But Article VII permitted the Sauks to live on the 
land “as long as these lands remained the property 
of the United States.” To the Americans, this meant 
the Sauks could live there as long as it was federal 
land, but once the government surveyed it and 
sold tracts to homesteaders (as it did in fall 1829), 
the Sauks and Fox would have to move across the 
Mississippi River to present-day Iowa and never 
return.4 It seems unlikely that the chiefs fully 
understood the implications of this clause; while they 
had extensive dealings with whites for more than a 
century, those relations with Europeans had never 
pertained to land ownership, and they probably saw 
this as “a purely formal gesture of extending United 
States protection over a substantial party of their 
territory.”5 Regardless, when the delegation returned 
to Saukenuk, they continued to live on the land, 
plant and harvest corn, and bury their dead, just like 
they always had. The relationship became stormy in 
subsequent years. Like a number of western tribes, 
the Sauks joined the British in the War of 1812. 
At war’s end, Secretary of War (and State as well, 
temporarily)6 James Monroe appointed Clark, along 
with Illinois Territorial governor Ninian Edwards 
and St. Louis fur czar Auguste Chouteau, to bring 
together the pro-British tribes and lay down the 
law in new treaties. But Black Hawk’s group of 
Sauks didn’t show up. Clark was furious, fuming 
to Washington that “[t]he conduct of those savages, 
in the cold indifference with which they received 
several communications in regard to the late treaty, 
. . . together with the suggestions and admonitions 
of the British officers themselves, to be on our guard 
against them, leave no doubt on our mind that it is 
the intention of those tribes to continue the war, and 
that nothing less than a vigorous display of military 
force can change their disposition.”7 Threats and ill-
will finally led to their coming to St. Louis to sign the 
treaty with the Red-Headed Chief the following year.8 
In the 1816 treaty, the Rock River Sauks “do hereby 
unconditionally assent to recognize, re-establish, 
and confirm the treaty” of 1804, but without any 
reference to its terms.9 As far as the Americans were 
concerned, the Sauks were merely guests on the land 
along Rock River until white folks moved in.
 Some, like Keokuk and most of the Mesquakies, 
saw the writing on the wall in the 1820s and began 
migrating westward across the Mississippi. Others, 
like Black Hawk, refused to recognize the land 
cession and remained, saying that the original treaty 
was signed without the consent of the tribe; besides 
he argued, by not accepting annuities, they were 
not giving up their homeland. American expansion 
pushed more Native Americans westward so that 
more Indians were living in and competing with 
more Indians in less space, leading to heightened 
competition with both one another and with tribes 
farther west like the Sioux. The United States saw 
this competition as a low-budget way to control the 
tribes, keeping any one from getting too large and 
John Reynolds (1788–1865) became governor of Illinois in 
1830. He was responsible for calling out the Illinois state 
militia and took active command of it in Black Hawk’s War. 
To reward his efforts, President Andrew Jackson named him 
a major-general. He resigned as governor in 1834 when he 
was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. (Image: 
Portrait and Biographical Album of Whiteside County, 
Illinois, 1887)
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strong, since the army was shrunken so small that it 
could not police the frontier itself. 10 So, when whites 
began moving to northwestern Illinois to farm and 
mine lead on the same land, the situation became 
even more volatile. 
 By decade’s end, Clark made sure that the Sauks 
knew it was time to move; some did so as ordered, 
others did not. Clark was still exhibiting his typical 
patience in 1829, telling Indian Superintendent 
Thomas McKenney that the Sauks who remained 
held “the opinion that they have been defrauded of 
an immensely valuable Country,” and that being 
removed with such a small annuity “produces 
unfriendly feelings, particularly among those who 
are under British influence,” which was bound to 
create problems with the fast-encroaching whites. 
Perhaps, Clark suggested, the United States should 
meet with the chiefs and try to work out a new 
treaty with a timetable for moving that both sides 
found workable.11 After all, he told war secretary 
John Eaton, “no power is vested in me to stop the 
progress of settlements on ceded land, and I possess 
no other means of enticing the Indians to move 
than persuasion,” which would require substantial 
presents. Worse yet, Clark said, the hard feelings 
were unnecessary since “[t]he encroachments of 
the whites in this instance is to be regretted, as the 
removal of those Indians would have most probably 
been effected in the course of the next year. Other 
Tribes complain of the encroachments of the whites 
and on that subject, a general discontent appears to 
prevail among the Tribes of the state of Illinois.”12
 Federal land around Saukenuk went up for sale 
in September 1829, and settlers began moving in. 
Keokuk proved unable to persuade Black Hawk and 
his followers to vacate as they continued to farm the 
land themselves. About three dozen settlers wrote to 
Illinois governor John Reynolds for help. Some six or 
seven hundred Sauks from “the Black Hawk’s party” 
were nearby, reportedly destroying fences and wheat, 
taking land, threatening settlers trying to plant spring 
crops, and accusing settlers of stealing tribal lands.13 
Reynolds apprised Clark of the predicament and 
suggested “perhaps, a request from you to them for 
them to remove to the west side of the river would 
effect the object of procuring peace to the citizens of 
the State.”14 Or, Clark responded, perhaps not, saying 
that “every effort on my part has been made to effect 
the removal from Illinois of all the Tribes who have 
ceded their Lands.”15 The same day, Clark wrote to 
Gen. Edmund Gaines, commander in the region, to 
say that it was time to make good on the threats of 
military intervention against the recalcitrant bands.16 
Clark remained committed to the idea of civilizing 
cooperative Indians, though, and told Gaines to take 
care to not harm those who “have constantly and 
zealously cooperated with the Government Agents.”17
 Within a week, Gaines met with Sauk leaders 
over the issue. Illinois land was not theirs and had 
not been since 1804, Gaines explained (echoing the 
arguments Clark sent him). Jumping Fish said he had 
sold enough to free a brave in 1805, but certainly 
not such a swath as that.18 Gaines’s meeting with 
the volatile Black Hawk went even less smoothly. 
The Great Spirit placed the Sauk on the land, the 
warrior said, and he intended to stay, then exploded, 
“You asked, ‘Who I am’—I am a Sauk; my fathers 
were great men, and I wish to remain where the 
bones of my fathers are laid.” 19 Later, Black Hawk 
tried to argue that the Sauks received nothing for 
their cessions in treaties. With exasperation clearly 
mounting, Clark reported to Cass that Black Hawk 
didn’t have a leg to stand on this time. “The treaties 
referred to [1804, 1816, and 1824] have been 
frequently explained to the Sacs and Foxes,” Clark 
fumed, “and [one] of which (the 13th of May 1816) 
was signed by Black Hawk himself, the principal 
Gen. Edmund P. Gaines (1777–1849) was a veteran of 
the War of 1812 and, later, commander of the Western 
Military Department at the time of Black Hawk’s War. He 
was perhaps most famous in his lifetime for having arrested 
former vice president Aaron Burr and testified in his treason 
trial. (Image: National Archives)
Fall/Winter 2016–2017 | The Confluence | 9
Man of the party who signed the treaty. They have 
been frequently told by myself and their Agent, that 
they must move to their own land on the West side of 
the Mississippi and assured that if done so peaceably 
that assistance would be offered them. They however 
persisted in their refusal to move and settled within 
their own Country.”20 Keokuk tried to smooth things 
over the following day, but Gaines wanted none of 
it; the Sauks had to leave right away, and abandon 
the corn they had planted. In fact, he said, he would 
even replace the harvest, but Keokuk had to get his 
people out of Illinois or suffer the consequences. 
The arrival of some 1,400 Illinois Militia in late June 
made it easier for Gaines to bully the Sauks into 
signing “Articles of Agreement and Capitulation,” 
filled with language designed to leave Native 
Americans feeling both defeated and humiliated: 
They had tried to destroy settlers’ homes and farms 
and tried to orchestrate other tribes in the region to 
fight removal, but their “being convinced that such 
a war would tend speedily to annihilate them, they 
have voluntarily abandoned their hostile attitude and 
have sued for peace.” The terms of the agreement 
read as those that could only have been dictated by 
vengeful victors: permanent submission to American 
authority, ending any communication with British or 
unlicensed traders, allowing the Americans to build 
and use roads through their lands whose boundaries 
were ostensibly guaranteed. Left with little choice, 
Black Hawk touched the quill to the paper.21 Clark 
supported—even applauded—Gaines’s approach, 
saying the Sauks had been “insolent,” but “[t]his 
show of force, with the cool and determined course 
pursued towards this disaffected Band of Sacs has 
produced the desired effect, and I have no doubt 
will tend to convince the disaffected parts of Tribes 
on this frontier of the folly of their opposition to the 
U. States without a just cause.”22 When the Sauks 
traveled west for their annual winter hunt, many 
hoped that none would return to Saukenuk.
 Reports in late winter of 1832 suggested 
otherwise. Clark received word from the region 
that much was happening. Still, as late as early 
April, Clark thought a war could be averted; Gen. 
Henry Atkinson had already left for Rock Island 
via steamboat in hopes of intercepting the Sauks 
crossing the river to convince them to return west.23 
But such was not to be; Black Hawk had mustered 
together some 600 warriors, and “the arrival of the 
Troops seems to have considerable affected on the 
friendly Indians, but it appears, that nothing short 
of force of Arms, will deter the British band from 
their purpose.”24 That was it; Clark was ready to 
settle the issue once and for all, seething to War 
Secretary Lewis Cass, “I am fully of the opinion that 
a very considerable force, and properly concerted 
measures, will be indispensably necessary to 
drive those hostile bands from the lands they have 
invaded. . . . I am inclined to the belief that those 
Indians have well merited a severe chastisement; 
and would respectfully recommend the adoption of 
such measures as would ensure to the offenders such 
a degree of punishment as might be not only useful 
to themselves hereafter, but which would serve as a 
warning to others.” 25
 Events accelerated quickly. Keokuk denied 
responsibility for Black Hawk’s actions to Atkinson, 
then skedaddled to St. Louis to express fear to Clark 
Prince Maximilian of Wied-Neuwied (1782–1867) was 
a German prince who had a great interest in ethnology 
and the natural world. He had explored in South America 
in the 1820s and published his findings, and he traveled 
to the United States in 1832 to explore and describe the 
upper Missouri River. Before leaving for the upper Missouri 
in March 1833, Maximilian sat in on the negotiations 
between Clark and Keokuk at Clark’s meeting house; his 
description of the summit is the most complete record of the 
meeting extant. After returning to St. Louis in the spring of 
1834, he traveled back to Germany and wrote his Travels 
into the Interior of North America. Artist Karl Bodmer, who 
Maximilan hired to join him, painted some 88 illustrations 
for it. (Image: Qualitat fur Menschen)
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that the Americans would take out their anger on 
his peaceful—and cooperative—people. Relying 
on reports from both military leaders and Clark, 
Lewis Cass threatened “a general Indian war,” 
saying that no one less than Andrew Jackson himself 
had authorized war against Black Hawk and his 
followers. Clark agreed heartily, telling Cass that 
“it [is] highly gratifying, inasmuch as it develops the 
determination of the Government in relation to the 
war in which we are now involved with blood thirsty 
and ferocious savages. The faithless and treacherous 
character of those at the head of our Indian enemies 
appears now to be so well known and understood, 
as to permit an expression of the hope, that their 
wanton cruelties will eventually result in their own 
destruction; and as they have afforded sufficient 
evidence not only of their entire disregard of Treaties, 
but also of their deep-rooted hostility, in shedding 
the blood of our women and children, a War of 
Extermination should be waged against them. The 
honor and respectability of the Government require 
this:—the peace and quiet of the frontier, the lives 
and safety of its inhabitants demand it.”26
 But Clark also covered for his ally, Keokuk, 
assuring Cass the problem was an isolated one, and 
that once Black Hawk was out of the way, removal 
Hundreds of Sauk and Fox men, women, and children died at the Battle of Bad Axe on August 1 and 2, 1832, many in 
the river trying to escape. It ended conflict between the United States military and the tribes in the Michigan and Illinois 
territories. Most historians today characterize it as a massacre. (Image: Wikimedia Commons)
Fall/Winter 2016–2017 | The Confluence | 11
and civilization of the Sauks could proceed. At 
last, the hunger for land forced the two men—who 
reputedly knew and cared more about western 
Indians than any other whites—to resort to force.27 
Jackson himself gave the final orders to end the 
problem once and for all in mid-June.28 The army 
spent the next two months chasing Black Hawk 
and his followers around northwestern Illinois 
and southeastern Wisconsin until finally cornering 
them at Bad Axe Creek, slaughtering hundreds, and 
capturing Black Hawk and his fellow leaders for 
return to the prison at Jefferson Barracks.
 While all this was taking place, Clark and 
Cass worked to cement the loyalty of the rest of 
the Sauks in Iowa. Clark authorized 40,000 rations 
of provisions for “friendly Indians as may seek 
protection within the Indian agencies” in early July.29 
Soon after, he asked the war department to sign off 
on giving a blacksmith, gunsmith, and “assistance 
for Agriculture” to the friendly Sauks, Mesquakies, 
and Ioways who complied with American wishes, 
since they “will imperiously require some assistance 
in early preparations for agriculture.”30 A month 
later, Clark wrote to Lewis Cass with preliminary 
reports from the war; it appeared to be almost over.31 
Soon after, Clark left St. Louis for Rock Island to 
provide “aid of his advice and experience in certain 
contemplated arrangements with the Indians in that 
quarter” in preparation for the treaty talks scheduled 
for that fall.32
 It is often hard to tell when one is standing 
on the precipice of change. If William Clark 
thought so, he never wrote it down. Black Hawk 
returned from Washington defeated and convinced 
that Jackson was right—the Americans were as 
many as the leaves in the forest. From Keokuk’s 
standpoint, a new realpolitik was emerging where 
he would not be challenged by the likes of Black 
Hawk as he sought ways to work in the emerging 
order with the Americans. Now, though, the United 
States confirmed that it would do most anything to 
facilitate westward expansion—even bring out the 
military against Native Americans—and that a more 
Jacksonian view of Indian removal had become the 
order of the day. But when they stood in that prison at 
Jefferson Barracks, they all straddled a time of great 
change.
Gen. Henry Atkinson (1782–1842) had a long career 
working with western tribes as an emissary of the 
United States government. He led two expeditions to the 
Yellowstone River (in 1819 and 1825) and signed treaties 
of friendship with a number of tribes in the upper Great 
Plains. Given his experience, Atkinson was named to the 
general command of the army during Black Hawk’s War, 
for which he was criticized. (Image: Abraham Lincoln 
Presidential Library and Museum)
Keokuk (1767–1848) was a Sauk leader in Illinois and 
the Iowa Territory. Unlike Black Hawk, Keokuk was willing 
to work with American officials. In September 1832, 
Keokuk headed a delegation that traveled to St. Louis to 
try to negotiate Black Hawk’s release from imprisonment at 
Jefferson Barracks. (Image: National Museum of American 
Art)
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